2024年4月4日发(作者：濮宜春)

MSC 73/21/Add.1

ANNEX 5

Page205

ANNEX 4

PROCEDURES FOR FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

1Introduction

1.1 In the case of traditional craft, it has been possible to specify certain aspects of design or

construction in some level of detail, in a way which was consistent with some level of risk which

had over the years been intuitively accepted without having to be defined.

1.2With the development of large high-speed craft, this required experience has not been widely

available. However, with the now broad acceptance of the probabilistic approach to safety

assessments within industry as a whole, it is proposed that an analysis of failure performance may

be used to assist in the assessment of the safety of operation of high-speed craft.

1.3A practical, realistic and documented assessment of the failure characteristics of the craft and

its component systems shall be undertaken with the aim of defining and studying the important

failure conditions that may exist.

1.4This annex describes a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and gives guidance as to

how it may be applied by:

.1

.2

.3

.4

explaining basic principles;

providing the procedural steps necessary to perform an analysis;

identifying appropriate terms, assumptions, measures and failure modes; and

providing examples of the necessary worksheets.

1.5FMEA for high-speed craft is based on a single-failure concept under which each system at

various levels of a system's functional hierarchy is assumed to fail by one probable cause at a time.

The effects of the postulated failure are analysed and classified according to their severity. Such

effects may include secondary failures (or multiple failures) at other level(s). Any failure mode

which may cause a catastrophic effect to the craft shall be guarded against by system or equipment

redundancy unless the probability of such failure is extremely improbable (refer to section 13). For

failure modes causing hazardous effects, corrective measures may be accepted in lieu. A test

programme shall be drawn to confirm the conclusions of FMEA.

1.6Whilst FMEA is suggested as one of the most flexible analysis techniques, it is accepted that

there are other methods which may be used and which in certain circumstances may offer an

equally comprehensive insight into particular failure characteristics.

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MSC 73/21/Add.1

ANNEX 5

Page206

2Objectives

2.1The primary objective of FMEA is to provide a comprehensive, systematic and documented

investigation which establishes the important failure conditions of the craft and assesses their

significance with regard to the safety of the craft, its occupants and the environment.

2.2The main aims of undertaking the analysis are to:

.1provide the Administration with the results of a study into the craft's failure

characteristics so as to assist in an assessment of the levels of safety proposed for the

craft's operation;

provide craft operators with data to generate comprehensive training, operational and

maintenance programmes and documentation; and

provide craft and system designers with data to audit their proposed designs.

.2

.3

3Scope of application

3.1 FMEA shall be conducted for each high-speed craft, before its entry into service, in respect

of the systems as required under the provisions of 5.2, 9.1.10, 12.1.1 and 16.2.6 of this Code.

3.2For craft of the same design and having the same equipment, one FMEA on the lead craft will

be sufficient, but each of the craft shall be subject to the same FMEA conclusion trials.

4System failure mode and effects analysis

4.1Before proceeding with a detailed FMEA into the effects of the failure of the system elements

on the system functional output it is necessary to perform a functional failure analysis of the craft's

important systems. In this way only systems which fail the functional failure analysis need to be

investigated by a more detailed FMEA.

4.2When conducting a system FMEA the following typical operational modes within the normal

design environmental conditions of the craft shall be considered:

.1

.2

.3

normal seagoing conditions at full speed;

maximum permitted operating speed in congested waters; and

manoeuvring alongside.

4.3The functional interdependence of these systems shall also be described in either block

diagrams or fault-tree diagrams or in a narrative format to enable the failure effects to be understood.

As far as applicable, each of the systems to be analysed is assumed to fail in the following failure

modes:

.1complete loss of function;

I:

2024年4月4日发(作者：濮宜春)

MSC 73/21/Add.1

ANNEX 5

Page205

ANNEX 4

PROCEDURES FOR FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

1Introduction

1.1 In the case of traditional craft, it has been possible to specify certain aspects of design or

construction in some level of detail, in a way which was consistent with some level of risk which

had over the years been intuitively accepted without having to be defined.

1.2With the development of large high-speed craft, this required experience has not been widely

available. However, with the now broad acceptance of the probabilistic approach to safety

assessments within industry as a whole, it is proposed that an analysis of failure performance may

be used to assist in the assessment of the safety of operation of high-speed craft.

1.3A practical, realistic and documented assessment of the failure characteristics of the craft and

its component systems shall be undertaken with the aim of defining and studying the important

failure conditions that may exist.

1.4This annex describes a failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and gives guidance as to

how it may be applied by:

.1

.2

.3

.4

explaining basic principles;

providing the procedural steps necessary to perform an analysis;

identifying appropriate terms, assumptions, measures and failure modes; and

providing examples of the necessary worksheets.

1.5FMEA for high-speed craft is based on a single-failure concept under which each system at

various levels of a system's functional hierarchy is assumed to fail by one probable cause at a time.

The effects of the postulated failure are analysed and classified according to their severity. Such

effects may include secondary failures (or multiple failures) at other level(s). Any failure mode

which may cause a catastrophic effect to the craft shall be guarded against by system or equipment

redundancy unless the probability of such failure is extremely improbable (refer to section 13). For

failure modes causing hazardous effects, corrective measures may be accepted in lieu. A test

programme shall be drawn to confirm the conclusions of FMEA.

1.6Whilst FMEA is suggested as one of the most flexible analysis techniques, it is accepted that

there are other methods which may be used and which in certain circumstances may offer an

equally comprehensive insight into particular failure characteristics.

I:

MSC 73/21/Add.1

ANNEX 5

Page206

2Objectives

2.1The primary objective of FMEA is to provide a comprehensive, systematic and documented

investigation which establishes the important failure conditions of the craft and assesses their

significance with regard to the safety of the craft, its occupants and the environment.

2.2The main aims of undertaking the analysis are to:

.1provide the Administration with the results of a study into the craft's failure

characteristics so as to assist in an assessment of the levels of safety proposed for the

craft's operation;

provide craft operators with data to generate comprehensive training, operational and

maintenance programmes and documentation; and

provide craft and system designers with data to audit their proposed designs.

.2

.3

3Scope of application

3.1 FMEA shall be conducted for each high-speed craft, before its entry into service, in respect

of the systems as required under the provisions of 5.2, 9.1.10, 12.1.1 and 16.2.6 of this Code.

3.2For craft of the same design and having the same equipment, one FMEA on the lead craft will

be sufficient, but each of the craft shall be subject to the same FMEA conclusion trials.

4System failure mode and effects analysis

4.1Before proceeding with a detailed FMEA into the effects of the failure of the system elements

on the system functional output it is necessary to perform a functional failure analysis of the craft's

important systems. In this way only systems which fail the functional failure analysis need to be

investigated by a more detailed FMEA.

4.2When conducting a system FMEA the following typical operational modes within the normal

design environmental conditions of the craft shall be considered:

.1

.2

.3

normal seagoing conditions at full speed;

maximum permitted operating speed in congested waters; and

manoeuvring alongside.

4.3The functional interdependence of these systems shall also be described in either block

diagrams or fault-tree diagrams or in a narrative format to enable the failure effects to be understood.

As far as applicable, each of the systems to be analysed is assumed to fail in the following failure

modes:

.1complete loss of function;

I: