2024年5月25日发(作者：巴合美)
Unit 8 Crisis Management
Text A
A Crisis Made in Japan
In Japan there is a proverb, 'If it stinks, put a lid on it.' Alas, this seems to have been
Toyota's approach to its burgeoning safety crisis, initially denying, minimizing and
mitigating the problems involving brakes that don't brake and accelerators that have a
mind of their own. President Akio Toyoda, grandson of the founder, was MIA for two
weeks and the company has appeared less than forthcoming about critical safety
issues, risking the trust of its customers world-wide.
日本有句谚语：“要是闻着发臭，那就盖上盖子。”（眼不见为净。）丰田汽
车公司(Toyota)似乎就在以这种方式处理其日益凸现的汽车安全问题。对于不能
刹车的刹车以及颇有“主见”的油门，丰田起初是否认，然后想大事化小，后
来又百般推托。公司总裁丰田章男（Akio Toyoda)是丰田创始人的孙子，在危机
发生的头两周成了失踪人员，公司对重大汽车安全问题的反应似乎不再那么积
极，有负全球消费者对其的信任。
This has been a public-relations nightmare for Toyota, as its brand name has been
synonymous with quality and reliability. Crisis management does not get any more
woeful than this and the cost of this bungling so far-the $2 billion recall and the loss
of 17% of share value since Jan. 21, when the gas-pedal recall was announced-is only
a down payment on the final tally. The recall will surely expand, including cars
produced in Japan. Lawsuits are being filed and an expensive settlement looms. And
then there are the idle factories and empty showrooms to account for.
对丰田来说，这是一场公共关系的噩梦，因为长久以来，丰田品牌一直是品质
和可靠性的代名词。再也没有比这更糟糕的危机管理了，到目前为止，丰田已
为此付出20亿美元的召回费用，公司股价自2010年1月21日（当天丰田宣布因
油门踏板问题实施召回）以来下跌17%，而这些仅是丰田最后要承担的巨额损失
的首付款而已。召回规模肯定会扩大，将包括在日本生产的汽车；丰田已面临
多起法律诉讼，未来可能要付出高昂代价才能解决；而闲置的工厂和空荡荡的
汽车专卖店展示区同样意味着巨大的经济损失。
It is not surprising that Toyota's response has been dilatory and inept, because crisis
management in Japan is grossly undeveloped. Over the past two decades, I cannot
think of one instance where a Japanese company has done a good job managing a
crisis. The pattern is all too familiar, typically involving slow initial response,
minimizing the problem, foot dragging on the product recall, poor communication
with the public about the problem and too little compassion and concern for
consumers adversely affected by the product. Whether it's exploding televisions,
fire-prone appliances, tainted milk or false labeling, in case after case companies have
shortchanged their customers by shirking responsibility until the accumulated
evidence forces belated disclosure and recognition of culpability. The costs of such
negligence are low in Japan where compensation for product liability claims is mostly
derisory or non-existent.
丰田的反应如此迟钝笨拙倒也不足为奇，因为在日本，危机管理在很大程度上
还未发展起来。过去二十年来，我根本想不出来有哪家日本企业在危机管理上
做得不错。每家公司的反应都差不多，一开始反应迟钝，想大事化小，小事化
了，在产品召回上拖拖拉拉，就所存在问题与公众的沟通少得可怜，对因产品
问题而遭受影响的消费者漠不关心。无论是爆炸的电视机、易燃的家用电器、
变质的牛奶和错误的标签内容，这些企业一次又一次地欺骗消费者，逃避其应
负的责任，直到问题越来越多，证据确凿，它们才姗姗来迟，承认问题的存
在。这种漠视消费者的做法并不会给企业带来很大的损失，因为日本在产品责
任诉讼方面的赔偿额度较低，有时甚至没有。
One glowing exception to this parsimonious record is the saga involving
pharmaceutical companies that kept selling tainted blood products to hemophiliacs
that left many of them infected with HIV in the 1980s. The government was aware of
the issue and failed to stop this avoidable public health crisis. After years of denial,
the current finance minister, Naoto Kan, who was health minister in 1994, revealed
documents showing that the government allowed the companies to continue selling
the bad blood so that they would not lose market share to foreign companies selling
safe blood products. In doing so he paved the way for a relatively generous settlement
and an abject apology by drug company executives, collectively on hands and knees
touching their noses to the floor in demonstrating their contrition to victims.
在这方面，唯一的例外是发生在20世纪80年代的“毒血事件”。当时日本制药
企业长期将受到污染的血液制剂卖给血友病患者，导致他们中的许多人患上艾
滋病。日本政府明知问题存在，却没有采取措施制止这场本可避免的公共卫生
悲剧的发生。在抵赖多年后，日本现任财相、当时的厚生大臣菅直人(Naoto Kan)
在1994年公开相关文档，显示政府当时允许制药企业继续销售受污染的血液制
剂，以免将市场份额拱手让给那些销售无污染的血液制剂的外国公司。菅直人
的这一做法为相对慷慨的赔偿方案奠定了基础，并促使那些制药企业的高管向
受害者磕头忏悔。
Usually, however, producer interests trump consumer safety.
不过，一般来说，日本将制造商的利益置于消费者的安全之上。
Japanese firms often seek to cover up or fudge the facts and the people
communicating with the media and public often do not have the information they
need to do their job. The absence of a structure to quickly get accurate information to
top management hampers an accurate and adequate response. That leaves
management unprepared to deal with media questioning and conveys an image of
stonewalling and indifference.
日本企业往往试图掩盖或捏造事实，负责与媒体和大众打交道的人往往无法获
取应有的信息。机制的缺失导致企业高管层无法迅速获取精准的信息，进而影
响其反应的准确性和有效性。管理层在面对媒体质询时准备不足，因此会给人
一种推诿搪塞和冷漠无情的印像。
There is a cultural element to this penchant for mismanaging crisis. The shame and
embarrassment of owning up to product defects in a nation obsessed with
craftsmanship and quality raises the bar on disclosure and assuming responsibility.
And a high-status company like Toyota has much to lose since its corporate face is at
stake. The shame of producing defective cars is supposed to be other firms' problems,
2024年5月25日发(作者：巴合美)
Unit 8 Crisis Management
Text A
A Crisis Made in Japan
In Japan there is a proverb, 'If it stinks, put a lid on it.' Alas, this seems to have been
Toyota's approach to its burgeoning safety crisis, initially denying, minimizing and
mitigating the problems involving brakes that don't brake and accelerators that have a
mind of their own. President Akio Toyoda, grandson of the founder, was MIA for two
weeks and the company has appeared less than forthcoming about critical safety
issues, risking the trust of its customers world-wide.
日本有句谚语：“要是闻着发臭，那就盖上盖子。”（眼不见为净。）丰田汽
车公司(Toyota)似乎就在以这种方式处理其日益凸现的汽车安全问题。对于不能
刹车的刹车以及颇有“主见”的油门，丰田起初是否认，然后想大事化小，后
来又百般推托。公司总裁丰田章男（Akio Toyoda)是丰田创始人的孙子，在危机
发生的头两周成了失踪人员，公司对重大汽车安全问题的反应似乎不再那么积
极，有负全球消费者对其的信任。
This has been a public-relations nightmare for Toyota, as its brand name has been
synonymous with quality and reliability. Crisis management does not get any more
woeful than this and the cost of this bungling so far-the $2 billion recall and the loss
of 17% of share value since Jan. 21, when the gas-pedal recall was announced-is only
a down payment on the final tally. The recall will surely expand, including cars
produced in Japan. Lawsuits are being filed and an expensive settlement looms. And
then there are the idle factories and empty showrooms to account for.
对丰田来说，这是一场公共关系的噩梦，因为长久以来，丰田品牌一直是品质
和可靠性的代名词。再也没有比这更糟糕的危机管理了，到目前为止，丰田已
为此付出20亿美元的召回费用，公司股价自2010年1月21日（当天丰田宣布因
油门踏板问题实施召回）以来下跌17%，而这些仅是丰田最后要承担的巨额损失
的首付款而已。召回规模肯定会扩大，将包括在日本生产的汽车；丰田已面临
多起法律诉讼，未来可能要付出高昂代价才能解决；而闲置的工厂和空荡荡的
汽车专卖店展示区同样意味着巨大的经济损失。
It is not surprising that Toyota's response has been dilatory and inept, because crisis
management in Japan is grossly undeveloped. Over the past two decades, I cannot
think of one instance where a Japanese company has done a good job managing a
crisis. The pattern is all too familiar, typically involving slow initial response,
minimizing the problem, foot dragging on the product recall, poor communication
with the public about the problem and too little compassion and concern for
consumers adversely affected by the product. Whether it's exploding televisions,
fire-prone appliances, tainted milk or false labeling, in case after case companies have
shortchanged their customers by shirking responsibility until the accumulated
evidence forces belated disclosure and recognition of culpability. The costs of such
negligence are low in Japan where compensation for product liability claims is mostly
derisory or non-existent.
丰田的反应如此迟钝笨拙倒也不足为奇，因为在日本，危机管理在很大程度上
还未发展起来。过去二十年来，我根本想不出来有哪家日本企业在危机管理上
做得不错。每家公司的反应都差不多，一开始反应迟钝，想大事化小，小事化
了，在产品召回上拖拖拉拉，就所存在问题与公众的沟通少得可怜，对因产品
问题而遭受影响的消费者漠不关心。无论是爆炸的电视机、易燃的家用电器、
变质的牛奶和错误的标签内容，这些企业一次又一次地欺骗消费者，逃避其应
负的责任，直到问题越来越多，证据确凿，它们才姗姗来迟，承认问题的存
在。这种漠视消费者的做法并不会给企业带来很大的损失，因为日本在产品责
任诉讼方面的赔偿额度较低，有时甚至没有。
One glowing exception to this parsimonious record is the saga involving
pharmaceutical companies that kept selling tainted blood products to hemophiliacs
that left many of them infected with HIV in the 1980s. The government was aware of
the issue and failed to stop this avoidable public health crisis. After years of denial,
the current finance minister, Naoto Kan, who was health minister in 1994, revealed
documents showing that the government allowed the companies to continue selling
the bad blood so that they would not lose market share to foreign companies selling
safe blood products. In doing so he paved the way for a relatively generous settlement
and an abject apology by drug company executives, collectively on hands and knees
touching their noses to the floor in demonstrating their contrition to victims.
在这方面，唯一的例外是发生在20世纪80年代的“毒血事件”。当时日本制药
企业长期将受到污染的血液制剂卖给血友病患者，导致他们中的许多人患上艾
滋病。日本政府明知问题存在，却没有采取措施制止这场本可避免的公共卫生
悲剧的发生。在抵赖多年后，日本现任财相、当时的厚生大臣菅直人(Naoto Kan)
在1994年公开相关文档，显示政府当时允许制药企业继续销售受污染的血液制
剂，以免将市场份额拱手让给那些销售无污染的血液制剂的外国公司。菅直人
的这一做法为相对慷慨的赔偿方案奠定了基础，并促使那些制药企业的高管向
受害者磕头忏悔。
Usually, however, producer interests trump consumer safety.
不过，一般来说，日本将制造商的利益置于消费者的安全之上。
Japanese firms often seek to cover up or fudge the facts and the people
communicating with the media and public often do not have the information they
need to do their job. The absence of a structure to quickly get accurate information to
top management hampers an accurate and adequate response. That leaves
management unprepared to deal with media questioning and conveys an image of
stonewalling and indifference.
日本企业往往试图掩盖或捏造事实，负责与媒体和大众打交道的人往往无法获
取应有的信息。机制的缺失导致企业高管层无法迅速获取精准的信息，进而影
响其反应的准确性和有效性。管理层在面对媒体质询时准备不足，因此会给人
一种推诿搪塞和冷漠无情的印像。
There is a cultural element to this penchant for mismanaging crisis. The shame and
embarrassment of owning up to product defects in a nation obsessed with
craftsmanship and quality raises the bar on disclosure and assuming responsibility.
And a high-status company like Toyota has much to lose since its corporate face is at
stake. The shame of producing defective cars is supposed to be other firms' problems,